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Abstract
We explore practical tradeoffs in blockchain-based bio-
metric template storage. We first discuss opportunities and
challenges in the integration of blockchain and biometrics,
with emphasis in biometric template storage and protec-
tion, a key problem in biometrics still largely unsolved.
Blockchain technologies provide excellent architectures and
practical tools for securing and managing the sensitive and
private data stored in biometric templates, but at a cost. We
explore experimentally the key tradeoffs involved in that in-
tegration, namely: latency, processing time, economic cost,
and biometric performance. We experimentally study those
factors by implementing a smart contract on Ethereum
for biometric template storage,1 whose cost-performance
is evaluated by varying the complexity of state-of-the-art
schemes for face and handwritten signature biometrics. We
report our experiments using popular benchmarks in bio-
metrics research, including deep learning approaches and
databases captured in the wild. As a result, we experimen-
tally show that straightforward schemes for data storage in
blockchain (i.e., direct and hash-based) may be prohibitive
for biometric template storage using state-of-the-art bio-
metric methods. A good cost-performance tradeoff is shown
by using a blockchain approach based on Merkle trees.
1. Introduction
The integration of the advantages and characteristics of
public blockchains in biometric systems is a very recent
area of research, but with a high potential and interest.
Combining blockchain and biometrics could poten-
tially have many advantages. As a first approximation,
the blockchain technology [20] could provide biometric
systems with some desirable characteristics such as im-
mutability, accountability, availability or universal ac-
1Deployed to the Ethereum Ropsten testnet at address:
0x8f737f448de451db9b1c046be7df3b48839673a1
cess. These properties enabled by blockchain technology
may be very useful, among other applications in biomet-
rics, to secure the biometric templates [14], and to assure
privacy in biometric systems [3].
However, despite these opportunities, the current
blockchain technology suffers from some potential limita-
tions that must be carefully studied and characterized before
the combination of both biometrics and blockchain tech-
nologies.
The main contribution of this study is two fold: 1)
we analyze cost and performance tradeoffs when using
blockchain for biometric template storage. We first discuss
the existing alternatives for the storage of large volumes of
data in blockchains, and how the complexity of schemes
for face and handwritten signature biometrics affects to the
cost and execution time of the final system; and 2) we ex-
perimentally measure these factors, optimizing the storage
requirements of each biometric scheme while keeping their
performances.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2 a description of the most relevant features of
blockchains, and the challenges and limitations of the tech-
nology that directly affect to biometric technologies is pro-
vided. In Section 3, we describe three popular storage tech-
niques for public blockchains, briefly analyzing their main
characteristics. Sections 4 and 5 present the setup and meth-
ods used in the experiments, whose results are shown in
Section 6. Finally, Section 7 draws the final conclusions.
2. Blockchain for Biometrics
2.1. Smart contracts
A smart contract is, essentially, a piece of code ex-
ecuted in a secure environment that controls digital as-
sets. Examples of these secure environments include reg-
ular servers controlled by “trusted parties”, decentralized
networks (blockchains), or servers with secure hardware
(SGX) [8, 9].
Many public blockchains support the execution of smart
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contracts, but Ethereum [4] is currently considered the most
reliable, secure and used. In essence, Ethereum could be
seen as a distributed computer, with capability to execute
programs written in Turing-complete, high-level program-
ming languages. These programs comprise a collection of
pre-defined instructions and data that has been recorded at a
specific address of a blockchain. For biometric purposes, a
smart contract running in a blockchain can assure a seman-
tically correct execution.
2.2. Challenges and limitations
Despite the new opportunities already described in pre-
vious sections, the combination of both blockchain and bio-
metric technologies is not straightforward due to the limi-
tations of the current blockchain technology. Among them,
it is important to remark: 1) its transaction processing ca-
pacity is currently very low (around tens of transactions per
second), 2) its actual design implies that all system trans-
actions must be stored, which makes the storage space nec-
essary for its management to grow very quickly, and 3) its
robustness against different types of attacks has not been
sufficiently studied yet.
In addition, public blockchains suffer from other limi-
tations which could impact the deployment and integration
with biometric systems:
• Economic cost of executing smart contracts: In or-
der to support smart contracts in blockchains (like
Ethereum), and to reward the nodes that use their com-
puting capacity to maintain the whole system, each in-
struction executed requires the payment of a fee in gas
units. This gas is paid in the native cryptocurrency of
Ethereum, called ether.
• Privacy: By design, all operations carried out in a pub-
lic blockchain are known to all the participating nodes.
Thus, it is not possible to directly use secret crypto-
graphic keys, which reduces the number of potential
applications.
• Processing capability: Another important limitation
is related to its processing capability. Ethereum, for
example, is able to run just around a dozen transac-
tions per second, what it could be not enough for some
scenarios.
• Scalability: Currently, the size of the public
blockchains (Bitcoin and Ethereum) is around 200GB,
and it is growing very fast. This can be a problem
for some application scenarios such as the Internet of
Things (IoT).
3. Storage requirements analysis
As stated in the previous section, one of the main poten-
tial limitations for the integration of both technologies is the
Operation Gas/KB ETH/KB $/KB
READ 6,400 0.000032 $0.004
WRITE 640,000 0.0032 $0.448
Table 1. Non-volatile storage costs in Ethereum. We have consid-
ered a gas price of 1 gwei (1 gwei = 10−9 ETH), and 1 ETH =
$140 (at time of writing, March 2019).
cost of running a biometric system (totally or partially) in a
blockchain. It is therefore crucial to properly estimate and
minimize that cost. The present paper is an initial attempt
in that regard.
This section describes the different existing schemes to
store large volumes of data (e.g., a database of biometric
templates) in public blockchains with smart contracts exe-
cution capabilities, like Ethereum.
There are essentially three approaches, which are pre-
sented below in terms of complexity (from lower to higher),
and economic cost (from higher lo lower):
• Full on-chain storage: all data is stored, as-is, in the
blockchain.
• Data hashing: the blockchain only stores a hash of the
data that guarantees its immutability. The data itself is
stored off-chain in other system: distributed (e.g., IPFS
[1]), cloud, or local.
• Merkle trees: data is stored also off-chain, but it is
preprocessed by constructing a Merkle tree structure,
which reduces storage costs and increases the band-
width.
These alternatives are discussed in more detail next.
3.1. Full on-chain storage
This is the simplest scheme and therefore, the most inef-
ficient and costly. In this case, the data are just stored in the
blockchain as is, without any type of pre-processing. For
example, biometric templates could be directly stored as a
data structure in a smart contract, as part of a more general
digital identity model.
In general terms, the storage space in public blockchains
is specially expensive compared to computation, in order to
discourage its abusive use. Therefore, as shown by exper-
iments and figures presented in Section 6, the use of this
storage scheme would commonly imply a prohibitive cost
for most biometric applications.
As an example, Table 1 depicts the cost of reading and
storing 1 Kilobyte of data in Ethereum in terms of gas units,
ether, and US dollars.
3.2. Data hashing
To overcome the problems of the previous scheme, a
more efficient approach is to store the data off-chain and
use the blockchain just as a integrity guarantee due to its
intrinsic immutability. This way, instead of the full data,
only a hash value of it is stored in the blockchain (smart
contract). Then, the complete template can be stored in any
other traditional external storage system (see Figure 1).
This possibility provides a great flexibility, because any
platform, as public clouds or existing corporate servers, can
be used to store the full set of biometric templates. In any
case, to maintain the distributed spirit, resistance to censor-
ship and high availability of public blockchains, distributed
storage systems such as IPFS or Swarm [16] would be de-
sirable in this case.
On the other hand, this approach can make use of any
cryptographic hash function, such as the SHA3 family,
which can produce outputs from 224 to 512 bits in length
[2]. In this work, we consider hashes of 256 bits per tem-
plate, which, in any case, can greatly reduce storage costs
compared to full on-chain storage.
One drawback of this approach is that it is still neces-
sary to ensure the availability of the data stored outside the
blockchain. If these data were lost or tampered, even when
this modification would be always noticed, the viability of
the system would be compromised.
3.3. Merkle trees
Finally, the previous scheme can be still further im-
proved, through the use of a data structure known as Merkle
tree [12]. This construction is widely used in cryptography
and computer science problems such as database integrity
verification [13], peer-to-peer networks [18] and, of course,
blockchains [4].
A Merkle tree is a binary tree data structure in which ev-
ery node contains the cryptographic hash of the concatena-
tion of its child nodes contents. Due to this recursive way of
constructing itself, the tree root contains statistical informa-
tion of the rest of nodes, and the modification of any node
content will cause the complete change of the value of the
root. This way, the integrity of an arbitrary amount of data
can be efficiently assured by arranging this data in a Merkle
tree form and securely storing the contents of its root node.
Regarding biometric template protection using
blockchains, a biometric system using this technique
would maintain a Merkle tree, storing a template at each
node and assuring the root node in a smart contract.
Therefore, when a new biometric template is created (after
the enrollement stage), or an existing one is modified or
deleted, the tree is re-calculated and the new root is updated
in the blockchain. A simplified scheme of this approach
can be found in Fig. 1 (right).
4. Experimental methods
4.1. Blockchain technology
The baseline architecture considered for performing the
experiments presented in this work was initially introduced
in [5]. This architecture substitutes the usual template
database of a biometric system by a blockchain, adding ba-
sic operations (i.e., creation, modification and deletion of
templates) through the use of smart contracts.
This design provides some advantages:
• The modifications to the existing biometric architec-
tures are minimal, so that usual biometric techniques
and algorithms (e.g., feature extraction and matching)
can be used normally.
• Since the biometric process is performed off-chain,
this architecture avoids the scalability problems of
public blockchains (except in a massive batch of user
registration during the system startup, for example).
• No need to use complex smart contracts, which facili-
tates development and reduces execution costs. Smart
contracts do not implement biometric “logic”, but only
the minimum necessary functions to manage the stor-
age of the templates.
As stated, we have implemented a basic smart contract,
that has been deployed to the Ropsten Ethereum testnet.
The contract models a biometric template as a data struc-
ture BiometricTemplate implemented as a raw array of
bytes. This structure is stored in a mapping (or hash table),
with an identifier number for the user acting as the mapping
key mapping(uint => BiometricTemplate). The
source code of smart contracts can be found in Appendix
A. The main operations are described below:
• Creation: Receives the user ID, template data and
metadata, and adds a new BiometricTemplate
structure to the blockchain.
• Modification: Modifies the template of an existing
user. For a hash table storage scheme, this is equiv-
alent to an addition operation.
• Deletion: Removes the link between a specific tem-
plate and user ID. Due to the public nature of
Ethereum, technically the old template data remains
forever in the blockchain.
• Retrieval: Retrieves the BiometricTemplate struc-
ture for a user. This function is a call, not a transaction
as the rest of functions. This operation is usually read-
only (and, therefore, free to execute), while the previ-
ous three operations were potentially state-changing.
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Figure 1. Biometric systems using data hashing (left) and Merkle trees (right) blockchain storage techniques.
4.2. Biometric systems
Two different biometric traits are considered in the anal-
ysis: 1) face, and 2) dynamic signature. In this way we ex-
periment both with image-based physiological biometrics,
and with signal-based behavioral biometrics.
4.2.1 Face biometrics
One of the most popular face recognition based on deep
convolutional neural networks (DCNNs) are evaluated in
this study: VGG-Face [17].
In this system images are propagated through the CNN
obtaining the features at the last fully connected layer. The
final matching score is computed through the Euclidean dis-
tance of the features obtained from each face image. The
dimension of the face features are of 4,096.
4.2.2 Dynamic signature biometrics
Two popular approaches are evaluated in this study: i)
feature-based systems (a.k.a. global systems), and ii) time
functions-based systems (a.k.a. local systems).
For the global system, we extract for each signature a to-
tal of 100 global features from the normalized X and Y spa-
tial coordinates. These features are described in [11], and
are related to time, kinematic, direction, and geometry in-
formation. For the similarity computation, the Mahalanobis
distance is used to compare the similarity between a signa-
ture and a claimed user model.
For the local system, a total of 21 local features are ex-
tracted from the normalised signals X and Y spatial coor-
dinates [19]. For the similarity computation, DTW is used
to compare the similarity between genuine and query input
samples, finding the optimal elastic match among time se-
quences that minimises a given distance measure.
5. Experimental protocol
This section describes the main characteristics of the bio-
metric systems evaluated, and the key tradeoffs involved in
the integration of blockchain technology in both face and
dynamic signature biometric traits.
This integration is evaluated in terms of cost of storage,
execution, and performance in the Ethereum blockchain.
Two popular biometric databases are considered for the
analysis of face and signature biometrics: Labeled Faces in
the Wild (LFW) [10], and Biosecure [15].
5.1. Face
5.1.1 Databases
Face verification experiments are conducted on the LFW
database (Labeled Faced in the Wild) [7]. LFW is one of the
most popular datasets used in face recognition with more
than 13,000 face images of famous people collected from
the web. We have used the aligned dataset where each im-
age was aligned with funneling techniques.
5.1.2 Data processing
The VGG-Face pre-trained model was tested using the un-
restricted and outside training data protocols proposed in
[7]. The VGG-Face model was trained with VGG-Face
database [17], therefore there is not extra training for the
pre-trained model used here. The evaluation results are
computed for 6,000 one-to-one comparisons composed by
3,000 genuine pairs (pairs of images from the same person)
and 3,000 impostor pairs (pairs of images belonging to dif-
ferent persons) following the protocols from LFW database.
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Figure 2. System performance results in terms of the size of the
feature embeddings for VGG-Face CNNs model.
5.2. Dynamic signature
5.2.1 Databases
The dynamic signature verification technology is analyzed
using the Biosecure DS2 dataset. This dataset was captured
using a Wacom Intuous 3 digitizing tablet with an inking
pen in an office-like scenario, providing the following in-
formation: X and Y spatial coordinates, pressure, and times-
tamp (sampling frequency 100 Hz).
5.2.2 Data processing
In this study, we consider a set of 50 users. For each user,
the first 5 genuine signatures of the first session are used
for training, whereas the 15 genuine signatures of the sec-
ond session are left for testing in order to consider the inter-
session variability. In this study we analyze the robustness
of our proposed system against random (zero-effort) forg-
eries. Scores are obtained by comparing the training signa-
tures with one genuine signature of the remaining users. For
the global system, scores are obtained by comparing signa-
tures against the user model, while for the local system, the
average score of the five one-to-one comparisons is used.
5.3. Blockchain integration tradeoffs
5.3.1 Face
The system performance results in terms of EER (%) for
VGG-Face CNN model is depicted in Fig. 2 for different
sizes of the biometric template. This analysis has been car-
ried out by removing features randomly from the original
feature embedding.
Analyzing results in Fig. 2, in general the system perfor-
mance is very stable while we gradually remove features.
VGG-Face is able to obtain a verification rate with an ac-
curacy of 89% only using 100 features (only 2.5% from the
original 4096 features). This behavior shows that there is
a very high redundancy within the feature embedding of
CNNs face models, which makes possible to obtain very
competitive verification performance while keeping only a
small set of features.
5.3.2 Dynamic signature
The system performance results in terms of EER (%) of
both global and local systems are depicted in Fig. 3 for dif-
ferent sizes of the biometric template. This analysis has
been carried out using Sequential Forward Floating Search
(SFFS) in order to select the best subsets of global and local
features that improve the system performance in terms of
EER (%).
Analyzing in Fig. 3 (left) the global approach, the sys-
tem performance improves when increasing from 1 to 30-
40 global features. After that, a degradation of the system
performance is produced when adding more global features
to the optimal feature vector. Therefore, in order to reduce
the cost of saving the biometric templates in the blockchain
platform, and also achieve the best possible system perfor-
mance, we propose to save the best 30 global features in the
biometric template, achieving this way a final 1.5% EER.
The same analysis has been carried out for the local ap-
proach in Fig. 3 (right). The system performance improves
when adding more local features, achieving for the best sys-
tem performance a final 0.5% EER using 9 local functions
(total number of features = 9 local functions× average time
samples per signature = 3,087 features).
6. Experimental results
This section analyzes the results of the evaluation of the
integration of the biometric systems previously described in
Ethereum, resumed in Table 2.
The smart contract developed has been writ-
ten in Solidity language, and deployed to
the Ethereum Ropsten testnet at the address
0x8f737f448de451db9b1c046be7df3b48839673a1,
where can be verified with any blockchain explorer like
Etherscan [6]. It is a basic contract, which has not been
optimised and does not take care of security issues, and
should be used only for experimental purposes.
Table 2 shows the costs of the different operations over
the templates (creation, modification, deletion, and re-
trieval) in units of gas and US dollars, for the biometric
technologies and blockchain storage schemes evaluated.
The results clearly prove that the most efficient storage
scheme is the one based on Merkle trees. In fact, it is the
only one capable of storing any amount of data for the same
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Figure 3. System performance results in terms of the size of the optimal feature/time function vector selected by the SFFS algorithm.
Left: global system. Right: local system. For local system: #Features = #Local Functions × Average time samples per signature (343).
Biometric Operation Storage scheme Performance
Scheme
Template
size Full on-chain
Data hashing
(cost per template)
Merkle trees
(cost for any number
of templates)
Execution time
(average)
- -
Smart contract
deployment
498274 gas
($0.06972) 19.19 secs
Signature
Global
30 x 16 bits
Creation 108844 gas
($0.014)
86848 gas
($0.0122) 10.66 secsModification
Deletion
21378 gas
($0.003)
18850 gas
($0.0026) 11.55 secs
Retrieval - - - -
Local
3087 x 16 bits
Creation 4358990 gas
($0.610)
86848 gas
($0.0122) 12.61 secsModification
Deletion
504322 gas
($0.07)
18850 gas
($0.0026) 12.85 secs
Retrieval - - - -
Face VGG-Face100 x 32 bits
Creation 352912 gas
($0.049)
86848 gas
($0.0122) 10.53 secsModification
Deletion
49192 gas
($0.0068)
18850 gas
($0.0026) 16.38 secs
Retrieval - - - -
Table 2. We have considered a gas price of 1 gwei (1 gwei = 10−9 ETH), and 1 ETH = $140 (accurate at time of writing, March 2019).
cost. The rest of the schemes would quickly have a pro-
hibitive cost for the number of templates to be stored in a
real environment.
For example, protecting a million of templates would
cost between $14,000 and $610,000 for the signature sys-
tem, and $49,000 for VGG Face using the full on-chain
storage scheme. Clearly this is not a realistic option, dis-
couraged not only in economic terms, but also for security
and performance reasons.
The data hashing scheme would improve significantly
those figures, because it does not store the data itself, but
only a hash that guarantees the integrity. For the same sce-
nario, the cost would be a much more reasonable amount of
$12,200 for all the biometric technologies.
Finally, the Merkle trees scheme would imply a cost of
only one cent of dollar ($0.0122) for the storage of any
amount of templates. In addition, also the modification op-
eration of a template would have the same cost. However,
even for a biometric system operating in a large corporation
or environment, these costs seem reasonable.
Of course, all these prices could vary greatly depending
on the price of ether, which, as the rest of cryptocurrencies,
usually suffers sharp increases and falls in price. However,
because it only needs to store 256 bits regardless of the total
volume of data, the Merkle tree scheme would still have a
reasonable cost in any case.
In terms of execution time and performance, the exper-
iments also show that this hybrid system is viable. It is
important to note that the tests have been carried out in a
testnet, where the confirmation times are higher and have
greater variability than in the mainnet. Times have been
measured performing each operation ten times, discarding
the minimum and maximum times, and calculating the av-
erage of the rest.
As can be seen, the execution time is slightly higher than
10 seconds for most of the operations and biometric sys-
tems, which seems an acceptable time for the usability of
the system even during a user enrollment, for example.
Finally, the retrieval operation, necessary for the verifi-
cation of a template, is a read-only operation and, therefore,
free of cost. In addition, it can be also considered imme-
diate in terms of execution time, due to that the request is
processed by the local Ethereum node, and it does not reach
the network.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we have explored the viability of biometric
systems based on blockchain with focus on storing the bio-
metric templates. This experimental exploration has been
around key cost-performance tradeoffs, in particular: time
of execution of the transactions, economic cost, and biomet-
ric performance.
We have first discussed the main storage schemes for
public blockchains (Ethereum), and implemented a smart
contract for the estimation of its storage cost. The results
obtained prove that straightforward schemes such as the di-
rect storage of the biometric templates on-chain, or direct
data hashing, are not appropriate for a real biometric sys-
tem. However, when Merkle trees are included as an inter-
mediate data structure, the storage costs become fixed re-
gardless the total volume of data to store, and reduced exe-
cution times (between 10 - 20 seconds for write operations)
are obtained. The read operations (retrieving) of templates
are usually free of cost and very fast to execute, because
they are processed locally.
In brief, in this work we have shown that the integration
of biometric and public blockchains is possible both from
an economic and performance perspective, including two
case studies with state-of-the-art methods and protocols in
face and signature biometrics.
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A. Appendix: Smart contract source code
pragma solidity >=0.4.22 <0.6.0;
contract BioBlockchain {
/// This struct models a simple biometric template
struct BiometricTemplate {
bytes templateMetadata;
bytes templateData;
}
/// Each template is indexed by an user ID
mapping(uint => BiometricTemplate) templates;
/// Store a new template
function createNewTemplate(uint _templateID,
bytes memory _templateMetaData,
bytes memory _templateData) public {
/// Add new template to mapping
templates[_templateID].templateMetadata = _templateMetaData;
templates[_templateID].templateData = _templateData;
}
/// Return a user template
function getTemplate(uint _templateID) view public returns (bytes memory) {
return(templates[_templateID].templateData);
}
/// Modify a user template
function modifyTemplate(uint _userID,
bytes memory _newTemplateMetaData,
bytes memory _newTemplateData) public {
// Due to that a mapping is internally implemented using
// a hash table, the modification operation is equivalent
// to a insertion
createNewTemplate(_userID, _newTemplateMetaData, _newTemplateData);
}
/// Return an specific template
function deleteTemplate(uint _userID) public {
delete templates[_userID];
}
}
